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1 Introduction
The aim of this article is to introduce the theory of judgment aggregation, a
growing research area in economics, philosophy, political science, law and com-
puter science. The theory addresses the following question: How can a group of
individuals make consistent collective judgments on a given set of propositions
on the basis of the group membersindividual judgments on them? This problem
is one of the fundamental problems of democratic decision-making and arises in
many di¤erent settings, ranging from legislative committees to referenda, from
expert panels to juries and multi-member courts, from boards of companies to
the WTO and the UN Security Council, from families to large social organiza-
tions. While each real-world case deserves social-scientic attention in its own
right, the theory of judgment aggregation seeks to provide a general theoretical
framework for investigating some of the properties that di¤erent judgment ag-
gregation problems have in common, abstracting from the specics of concrete
cases.
The recent interest in judgment aggregation was sparked by the observation
that majority voting, perhaps the most common democratic procedure, fails
to guarantee consistent collective judments whenever the decision problem in
question exceeds a certain level of complexity, as explained in detail below.
This observation, which has become known as the discursive dilemma, but
which can be seen as a generalization of a classic paradox discovered by the
Marquis de Condorcet in the 18th century, was subsequently shown to illustrate
a deeper impossibility result, of which there are now several variants in the
literature. Roughly speaking, there does not exist any method of aggregation
an aggregation rulewhich (i) guarantees consistent collective judgments
and (ii) satises some other salient properties exemplied by majority voting,
such as determining the collective judgment on each proposition as a function of
individual judgments on that proposition and giving all individuals equal weight
in the aggregation. This impossibility result, in turn, enables us to see how far we
need to deviate from majority voting, and thereby from conventional democratic
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principles, in order to come up with workable solutions to judgment aggregation
problems. In particular, the impossibility result allows us to construct a map of
the logical spacein which di¤erent possible solutions to judgment aggregation
problems can be positioned.
Just as the theory of judgment aggregation is thematically broad, so its in-
tellectual origins are manifold. Although this article is not intended to be a
comprehensive survey, a few historical remarks are useful.1 The initial observa-
tion that sparked the recent development of the eld goes back to some work
in jurisprudence, on decision-making in collegial courts (Kornhauser and Sager
1986, 1993; Kornhauser 1992), but was later reinterpreted more generally as
a problem of majority inconsistency  by Pettit (2001), Brennan (2001) and
List and Pettit (2002). List and Pettit (2002, 2004) introduced a rst formal
model of judgment aggregation, combining social choice theory and proposi-
tional logic, and proved a simple impossibility theorem, which was strengthened
and extended by several authors, beginning with Pauly and van Hees (2006) and
Dietrich (2006). Independently, Nehring and Puppe (2002) proved some pow-
erful results on the theory of strategy-proof social choice which turned out to
have signicant corollaries for the theory of judgment aggregation (Nehring and
Puppe 2007a). In particular, they rst characterized the class of decision prob-
lems for which certain impossibility results hold, inspiring subsequent related
results by Dokow and Holzman (forthcoming), Dietrich and List (2007a) and
others. A very general extension of the model of judgment aggregation, from
propositional logic to any logic within a large class, was developed by Dietrich
(2007a). The theory of judgment aggregation is also related to the theories
of abstractaggregation (Wilson 1975, Rubinstein and Fishburn 1986), belief
merging in computer science (Konieczny and Pino Pérez 2002, see also Pigozzi
2006) and probability aggregation (e.g., McConway 1981, Genest and Zidek
1986, Mongin 1995), and has an informal precursor in the work of Guilbaud
(1966) on what he called the logical problem of aggregationand perhaps even
in Condorcets work itself. Modern axiomatic social choice theory, of course,
was founded by Arrow (1951/1963). (For a detailed discussion of the relation-
ship between Arrovian preference aggregation and judgment aggregation, see
List and Pettit 2004 and Dietrich and List 2007a.)
This article is structured as follows. In section 2, I explain the observation
that initially sparked the theory of judgment aggregation. In section 3, I intro-
duce the basic formal model of judgment aggregation, which then, in section 4,
allows me to present some illustrative variants of the generic impossibility re-
sult. In section 5, I turn to the question of how this impossibility result can be
avoided, going through several possible escape routes. In section 6, I relate the
theory of judgment aggregation to other branches of aggregation theory. And
in section 7, I make some concluding remarks. Rather than o¤ering a compre-
hensive survey of the theory of judgment aggregation, I hope to introduce the
theory in a succinct and pedagogical way, providing an illustrative rather than
1For short technical and philosophical surveys of salient aspects of the theory of judgment
aggregation, see, respectively, List and Puppe (forthcoming) and List (2006).
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exhaustive coverage of some of its key ideas and results.
2 A problem of majority inconsistency
Let me begin with Kornhauser and Sagers (1986) original example from the area
of jurisprudence: the so-called doctrinal paradox(the name was introduced in
Kornhauser 1992). Suppose a collegial court consisting of three judges has to
reach a verdict in a breach-of-contract case. The court is required to make
judgments on three propositions:
p: The defendant was contractually obliged not to do a particular action.
q: The defendant did that action.
r: The defendant is liable for breach of contract.
According to legal doctrine, propositions p and q are jointly necessary and suf-
cient for proposition r. Suppose now that the three judges are divided in their
judgments, as shown in Table 1. The rst thinks that p and q are both true,
and hence that r is true as well. The second thinks that p is true, but q is false,
and consequently r is also false. The third thinks that, while q is true, p is false,
and so r must be false too. So far so good. But what does the court as a whole
think?
p q r
Judge 1 True True True
Judge 2 True False False
Judge 3 False True False
Majority True True False
Table 1: A doctrinal paradox
If the judges take a majority vote on proposition r the conclusionthe
outcome is the rejection of this proposition: a not liableverdict. But if they
take majority votes on each of p and q instead the premisesthen both of
these propositions are accepted and hence the relevant legal doctrine dictates
that r should be accepted as well: a liableverdict. The courts decision thus
appears to depend on which aggregation rule it uses. If it uses the rst of the two
approaches outlined, the so-called conclusion-based procedure, it will reach a
not liableverdict; if it uses the second, the premise-based procedure, it will
reach a liable verdict. Kornhauser and Sagers doctrinal paradox consists
in the fact that the premise-based and conclusion-based procedures may yield
opposite outcomes for the same combination of individual judgments.2
But we can also make a more general observation from this example. Relative
to the given legal doctrine which states that r is true if and only if both p and q
2For recent discussions of the doctrinal paradox, see Kornhauser and Sager (2004) and
List and Pettit (2005).
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are true the majority judgments across the three propositions are inconsistent.
In precise terms, the set of propositions accepted by a majority, namely fp; q;not
rg, is logically inconsistent relative to the constraint that r if and only if p
and q. This problem that majority voting may lead to the acceptance of an
inconsistent set of propositions generalizes well beyond this example and does
not depend on the presence of any legal doctrine or other exogenous constraint;
nor does it depend on the partition of the relevant propositions into premises
and conclusions.
To illustrate this more general problem, consider any set of propositions with
some non-trivial logical connections; below I say more about the precise notion
of non-trivialityrequired. Take, for instance, the following three propositions
on which a multi-member government may seek to make collective judgments:
p: We can a¤ord a budget decit.
if p then q: If we can a¤ord a budget decit, then we should increase
spending on education.
q: We should increase spending on education.
Suppose now that one third of the government accepts all three propositions, a
second third accepts p but rejects if p then q as well as q, and the last third
accepts if p then q but rejects p as well as q, as shown in Table 2.
p if p then q q
1/3 of individuals True True True
1/3 of individuals True False False
1/3 of individuals False True False
Majority True True False
Table 2: A problem of majority inconsistency
Then each government member holds individually consistent judgments on
the three propositions, and yet there are majorities for p, for if p then q and
for not q, a logically inconsistent set of propositions. The fact that majority
voting may generate inconsistent collective judgments is sometimes called the
discursive dilemma(Pettit 2001, List and Pettit 2002; see also Brennan 2001),
but it is perhaps best described as the problem of majority inconsistency.
How general is this problem? It is easy to see that it can arise as soon
as the set of propositions (and their negations) on which judgments are to be
made exhibits a simple combinatorial property: it has a minimally inconsis-
tent subset of three or more propositions (Dietrich and List 2007b, Nehring
and Puppe 2007b). A set of propositions is called minimally inconsistentif it
is inconsistent and every proper subset of it is consistent. In the court exam-
ple, a minimally inconsistent set with these properties is fp, q, not rg, where
the inconsistency is relative to the constraint r if and only if p and q. In the
government example, it is fp, if p then q, not qg. As soon as there exists at
least one minimally inconsistent subset of three or more propositions among the
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proposition-negation pairs on the agenda, combinations of judgments such as
the one in Table 2 become possible, for which the majority judgments are incon-
sistent. Indeed, as explained in section 6 below, Condorcets classic paradox of
cyclical majority preferences is an instance of this general phenomenon, which
Guilbaud (1952) described as the Condorcet e¤ect.
3 The basic model of judgment aggregation
In order to go beyond the observation that majority voting may produce incon-
sistent collective judgments and to ask whether other aggregation rules may be
immune to this problem, it is necessary to introduce a more general model, which
abstracts from the specic decision problem and aggregation rule in question.
My exposition of this model follows the formalism introduced in List and Pettit
(2002) and extended beyond standard propositional logic by Dietrich (2007a).
There is a nite set of (two or more) individuals, who have to make judg-
ments on some propositions.3 Propositions are represented by sentences from
propositional logic or a more expressive logical language, and they are generally
denoted p, q, r and so on. Propositional logic can express atomic propositions,
which do not contain any logical connectives, such as the proposition that we
can a¤ord a budget decit or the proposition that spending on education should
be increased, as well as compound propositions, with the logical connectives
not, and, or, if-then, if and only if, such as the proposition that if we can a¤ord
a budget decit, then spending on education should be increased. Instead of
propositional logic, any logic with some minimal properties can be used, includ-
ing expressively richer logics such as predicate, modal, deontic and conditional
logics (Dietrich 2007a). Crucially, the logic allows us to distinguish between
consistentand inconsistentsets of propositions. For example, the set fp, q,
p and qg is consistent while the sets fp, if p then q, not qg or fp, not pg are
not.4
The set of propositions on which judgments are to be made in a particular
decision problem is called the agenda. Formally, the agendais dened as a
non-empty subset of the logical language, which is closed under negation, i.e.,
if p is on the agenda, then so is not p.5 In the government example, the agenda
contains the propositions p, if p then q, q and their negations. In the court
example, it contains p, q, r and their negations, but here there is an additional
3The agenda characterization results discussed further below require three or more indi-
viduals.
4 In propositional logic, a set of propositions is consistentif all its members can be simul-
taneously true, and inconsistentotherwise. More generally, consistency is denable in terms
of a more basic notion of logical entailment(Dietrich 2007a).
5For some formal results, it is necessary to exclude tautological or contradictory proposi-
tions from the agenda. Further, some results simplify when the agenda is assumed to be a
nite set of propositions. In order to avoid such technicalities, I make these simplifying as-
sumptions (i.e., no tautologies or contradictions, and a nite agenda) throughout this paper.
To render niteness compatible with negation-closure, I assume that double negations cancel
each other out; more elaborate constructions can be given.
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Figure 1: An aggregation rule
stipulation built into the logic according to which r if and only if p and q.6
Now each individuals judgment set is the set of propositions that this
individual accepts; formally, it is a subset of the agenda. On the standard
interpretation, to accept a proposition means to believe it to be true; on an
alternative interpretation, it could mean to desire it to be true. For the present
purposes, it is easiest to adopt the standard interpretation, i.e., to interpret
judgments as binary cognitive attitudes rather than as binary emotive ones.
A judgment set is called consistentif it is a consistent set of propositions in
the standard sense of the logic, and completeif it contains a member of each
proposition-negation pair on the agenda. A combination of judgment sets across
the given individuals is called a prole. Thus the rst three rows of Tables 1
and 2 are examples of proles on the agendas in question.
To complete the exposition of the basic model, it remains to dene the notion
of an aggregation rule. As illustrated in Figure 1, an aggregation rule is a
function that maps each prole of individual judgment sets in some domain to
a collective judgment set, interpreted as the set of propositions accepted by the
collective as a whole. Examples of aggregation rules are majority voting, as
already introduced, where each proposition is collectively accepted if and only if
it is accepted by a majority of individuals; supermajorityor unanimity rules,
where each proposition is collectively accepted if and only if it is accepted by
a certain qualied majority of individuals, such as two thirds, three quarters,
or all of them; dictatorships, where the collective judgment set is always the
individual judgment set of the same antecedently xed individual; and premise-
and conclusion-based procedures, as briey introduced in the court example
above.
Although at rst sight there seems to be an abundance of logically possible
aggregation rules, it is surprisingly di¢ cult to nd one that guarantees consistent
collective judgments. As we have already seen, majority voting notoriously fails
to do so as soon as the propositions on the agenda are non-trivially logically
6The full details of this construction are given in Dietrich and List (forthcoming).
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connected. Let me therefore turn to a more general, axiomatic investigation of
possible aggregation rules.
4 A general impossibility result
Are there any democratically compelling aggregation rules that guarantee con-
sistent collective judgments? The answer to this question depends on two para-
meters: rst, the types of decision problems as captured by the given agenda
for which we seek to employ the aggregation rule; and second, the conditions
that we expect it to meet. Before presenting some illustrative results, let me
briey explain why both parameters matter.
Suppose, for example, that we are only interested in decision problems that
involve making a single binary judgment, say on whether to accept p or not
p. In other words, the agenda contains only a single proposition-negation pair
(or, more generally, multiple logically unconnected such pairs). Obviously, we
can then use majority voting without any risk of collective inconsistency. As
we have already seen, the problem of majority inconsistency arises only if the
agenda exceeds a certain level of complexity (i.e., it has at least one minimally
inconsistent subset of three or more propositions). So the complexity of the deci-
sion problem in question is clearly relevant to the question of which aggregation
rules, if any, produce consistent collective judgments.
Secondly, suppose that, instead of using an aggregation rule that satises
strong democratic principles, we content ourselves with installing a dictatorship,
i.e., we appoint one individual whose judgments are deemed always to determine
the collective ones. If this individuals judgments are consistent, then, trivially,
so are the resulting collective ones. The problem of aggregation will have been
resolved under such a dictatorial arrangement, albeit in a degenerate way. This
shows that the answer to the question of whether there exist any aggregation
rules that ensure consistent collective judgments depends very much on what
conditions we expect those rules to meet.
With these preliminary remarks in place, let me address the question of the
existence of compelling aggregation rules in more detail. The original impossi-
bility theorem by List and Pettit (2002) gives a simple answer to this question
for a specic class of decision problems and a specic set of conditions on the
aggregation rule:
Theorem 1 (List and Pettit 2002) Let the agenda contain at least two distinct
atomic propositions (say, p, q) and either their conjunction (p and q), or their
disjunction (p or q), or their material implication (if p then q). Then there exists
no aggregation rule satisfying the conditions of universal domain, collective
rationality, systematicityand anonymity.
What are these conditions? The rst, universal domain, species the admis-
sible inputs of the aggregation rule, requiring the aggregation rule to admit as
input any possible prole of consistent and complete individual judgment sets on
the propositions on the agenda. The second, collective rationality, constrains the
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outputs of the aggregation rule, requiring the output always to be a consistent
and complete collective judgment set on the propositions on the agenda. The
third and fourth, systematicity and anonymity, constrain the way the outputs
are generated from the inputs and can thus be seen as responsiveness condi-
tions. Systematicity is the two-part requirement that (i) the collective judg-
ment on each proposition on the agenda depend only on individual judgments
on that proposition, not on individual judgments on other propositions (the in-
dependencerequirement), and (ii) the criterion for determining the collective
judgment on each proposition be the same across propositions (the neutrality
requirement). Anonymityrequires that the collective judgment set be invari-
ant under permutations of the judgment sets of di¤erent individuals in a given
prole; in other words, all individuals have equal weight in the aggregation.
Much can be said about these conditions I discuss them further in the sec-
tion on how to avoid the impossibility but for the moment it is enough to note
that they are inspired by key properties of majority voting. In fact, majority
voting satises them all, with the crucial exception of the consistency part of col-
lective rationality (for non-trivial agendas), as shown by the discursive dilemma.
The fact that majority voting exhibits this violation illustrates the theorem just
stated: no aggregation rule satises all four conditions simultaneously.
As mentioned in the introduction, this impossibility result has been signi-
cantly generalized and extended in a growing literature. Di¤erent impossibility
theorems apply to di¤erent classes of agendas, and they impose di¤erent con-
ditions on the aggregation rule. However, they share a generic form, stating
that, for a particular class of agendas, the aggregation rules satisfying a par-
ticular combination of input, output and responsiveness conditions are either
non-existent or otherwise degenerate. The precise class of agendas and input,
output and responsiveness conditions vary from result to result. For example,
Pauly and van Heess (2006) rst theorem states that if we take the same class
of agendas as in List and Pettits theorem and the same input and output con-
ditions (universal domain and collective rationality), keep the responsiveness
condition of systematicity but drop anonymity, then we are left only with dic-
tatorial aggregation rules, as dened above. Other theorems by Pauly and van
Hees (2006) and Dietrich (2006) show that, for more restrictive classes of agen-
das, again with the original input and output conditions and without anonymity,
but this time with systematicity weakened to its rst part (independence), we
are still left only with dictatorial or constant aggregation rules. The latter are
another kind of degenerate rules, which assign to every prole the same xed
collective judgment set, paying no attention to any of the individual judgment
sets. Another theorem, by Mongin (forthcoming), also keeps the original input
and output conditions, adds a responsiveness condition requiring the preser-
vation of unanimous individual judgments7 but weakens systematicity further,
namely to an independence condition restricted to atomic propositions alone.
The theorem then shows that, for a certain class of agendas, only dictatorial
7More formally, unanimity preservation is the requirement that if all individuals unani-
mously accept any proposition on the agenda, then that proposition be collectively accepted.
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aggregation rules satisfy these conditions together.
The most general theorems in the literature are so-called agenda character-
ization theorems. They do not merely show that for a certain class of agendas,
a certain combination of input, output and responsiveness conditions lead to an
empty or degenerate class of aggregation rules, but they fully characterize those
agendas for which this is the case and, by implication, those for which it is not.
The idea underlying agenda characterizations was introduced by Nehring and
Puppe (2002) in a di¤erent context, namely the theory of strategy-proof social
choice. However, several of their results carry over to judgment aggregation (as
discussed in Nehring and Puppe 2007a) and have inspired other agenda char-
acterization results (e.g., Dokow and Holzman forthcoming, Dietrich and List
2007).
To give a avour of these results, recall that only agendas which have at least
one minimally inconsistent subset of three or more propositions are of interest
from the perspective of impossibility theorems; call such agendas non-simple.
For agendas below this level of complexity, majority voting works perfectly
well.8 Non-simple agendas may or may not have some additional properties.
For example, they may or may not have a minimally inconsistent subset with
the special property that, by negating some even number of propositions in it,
it becomes consistent; call an agenda of this kind even-number-negatable.9
It now turns out that, for all and only those agendas which are both non-
simple and even-number-negatable, every aggregation rule satisfying universal
domain, collective rationality and systematicity  i.e., the original input, out-
put and responsiveness conditions is either dictatorial or inversely dictatorial
(the latter means that the collective judgment set is always the propositionwise
negation of the judgment set of some antecedently xed individual) (Dietrich
and List 2007a). Further, for all and only those agendas which are just non-
simple (whether or not they are even-number-negatable), every aggregation rule
satisfying the same conditions and an additional monotonicitycondition10 is
dictatorial (Nehring and Puppe 2002, 2007a). If we restrict these two classes
of agendas by adding a further property (called total blockedness or path-
connectedness11), then similar results hold with systematicity weakened to in-
dependence and an additional responsiveness condition of unanimity preserva-
tion(Dokow and Holzman forthcoming and Nehring and Puppe 2002, 2007a,
respectively).12 Table 3 surveys those results.
For each of the four rows of the table, the following two things are true:
8For such agendas, the majority judgments are always consistent and in the absence of ties
also complete.
9This property was introduced by Dietrich (2007a) and Dietrich and List (2007a). A
logically equivalent property is the algebraic property of non-a¢ nenessintroduced by Dokow
and Holzman (forthcoming).
10Roughly speaking, monotonicity is the requirement that if any proposition is collectively
accepted for a given prole of individual judgment sets and we consider another prole in
which an additional individual accepts that proposition (other things being equal), then this
proposition remains accepted.
11This property, rst introduced by Nehring and Puppe (2002), requires that any proposition
on the agenda can be deduced from any other via a sequence of pairwise logical entailments
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Class of
agendas Input Output Respness
Resulting
agg. rules
N o n - s im p le U n iv . d om a in C o l l . r a t io n a l i ty
S y s t em a t i c i ty
M o n o t o n ic i ty
D ic t a t o r s h ip s
(Nehring and Puppe 2002, 2007a)
N o n - s im p le
E v e n -n um b . -n e g .
U n iv . d om a in C o l l . r a t io n a l i ty S y s t em a t i c i ty
D ic t a t o r s h ip s
In v . d i c t s h ip s
(Dietrich and List 2007a)
N o n - s im p le
P a th - c o n n e c t e d
U n iv . d om a in C o l l . r a t io n a l i ty
In d e p e n d e n c e
M o n o t o n ic i ty
U n a n im . p r e s e r v .
D ic t a t o r s h ip s
(Nehring and Puppe 2002, 2007a)
N o n - s im p le
P a th - c o n n e c t e d
E v e n -n um b . -n e g .
U n iv . d om a in C o l l . r a t io n a l i ty
In d e p e n d e n c e
U n a n im . p r e s e r v .
D ic t a t o r s h ip s
(Dokow and Holzman forthcoming)
Table 3: Agenda characterization results
rst, if the agenda has the property described in the left-most column, every
aggregation rule satisfying the specied input, output and responsiveness con-
ditions is of the kind described in the right-most column; and second, if the
agenda violates the property in the left-most column, there exist aggregation
rules other than those described in the right-most column which still satisfy the
specied conditions.
The theorems reviewed in this section show that if (i) we deal with decision
problems involving agendas with some of the identied properties and (ii) we
consider the specied input, output and responsiveness conditions to be indis-
pensable requirements of democratic aggregation, then judgment aggregation
problems have no non-degenerate solutions. To avoid this implication, we must
therefore deny either (i) or (ii). Unless we can somehow avoid non-trivial de-
cision problems altogether, denying (i) does not seem to be a viable option.
Therefore we must obviously deny (ii). So what options do we have? Which of
the conditions might we relax?
5 Avoiding the impossibility
As noted, the conditions leading to an impossibility result  i.e., the non-
existence of any non-degenerate aggregation rules fall into three types: input,
output and responsiveness conditions. For each type of condition, we can ask
whether a suitable relaxation would enable us to avoid the impossibility.
conditional on other propositions on the agenda.
12A weaker variant of the result without monotonicity (specically, an if rather than if
and only ifresult) was also proved by Dietrich and List (2007a).
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5.1 Relaxing the input conditions
All the impossibility theorems reviewed so far impose the condition of universal
domain on the aggregation rule, by which any possible prole of consistent
and complete individual judgment sets on the propositions on the agenda is
deemed admissible as input to the aggregation. At rst sight this condition
seems eminently reasonable. After all, we want the aggregation rule to work not
only for some special inputs, but for all possible inputs that may be submitted
to it. However, di¤erent groups may exhibit di¤erent levels of pluralism, and in
some groups there may be signicantly more agreement between the members
judgments than in others. Expert panels or ideologically well structured societies
may be more homogeneous than some large and internally diverse electorates.
Thus the proles of individual judgment sets leading to collective inconsistencies
under plausible aggregation rules such as majority voting may be more likely to
occur in some heterogeneous groups than in other more homogeneous ones. Can
we say something systematic about the type of homogeneitythat is required for
the avoidance of majority inconsistencies and by implication for the avoidance
of the more general impossibility of judgment aggregation?
It turns out that there exist several combinatorial conditions with the prop-
erty that, on the restricted domain of proles of individual judgment sets sat-
isfying those conditions, majority voting generates consistent and (absent ties)
complete individual judgment sets and  of course  satises the various re-
sponsiveness conditions introduced in the last section. For brevity, let me here
discuss just two illustrative such conditions: a very simple one and a very general
one.
The rst is called unidimensional alignment (List 2003). It is similar in
spirit, but not equivalent, to a much earlier condition in the theory of preference
aggregation, called single-peakedness, which was introduced in a classic paper
by Black (1948). (Single-peakedness is a constraint on proles of preference
orderings rather than judgment sets.) A prole of individual judgment sets is
unidimensionally alignedif it is possible to align the individuals from left to
right such that, for every proposition on the agenda, the individuals accepting
the proposition are either all to the left, or all to the right, of those rejecting it,
as illustrated in Table 4.
Ind. 1 Ind. 2 Ind. 3 Ind. 4 Ind. 5
p True False False False False
if p then q False True True True True
q False False False True True
Table 4: A unidimensionally aligned prole of individual judgment sets
The relevant left-right alignment of the individuals may be interpreted as
capturing their position on some cognitive or ideological dimension (e.g., from
socio-economic left to right, or from urban to rural, or from secular to religious,
or from environmentally risk-averse to environmentally risk-taking etc.), but
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what matters from the perspective of achieving majority consistency is not the
semantic interpretation of the alignment but rather the combinatorial constraint
it imposes on individual judgments.
Why is unidimensional alignment su¢ cient for consistent majority judg-
ments? Since the individuals accepting each proposition are opposite those
rejecting it on the given left-right alignment, a proposition cannot be accepted
by a majority unless it is accepted by the middle individual on that alignment13
individual 3 in the example of Table 4. In particular, the majority judgments
must coincide with the middle individuals judgments.14 Hence, so long as the
middle individual holds consistent judgments, the resulting majority judgments
will be consistent too.15 When restricted to the domain of unidimensionally
aligned proles of individual judgment sets,16 majority voting therefore satis-
es all the conditions introduced in the last section, except of course universal
domain.
However, while unidimensional alignment is su¢ cient for majority consis-
tency, it is by no means necessary. A necessary and su¢ cient condition is the
following (Dietrich and List 2007c). A prole is called majority consistentif
every minimally inconsistent subset of the agenda contains at least one proposi-
tion that is not accepted by a majority. Is it easy to see that this is indeed enough
to ensure consistent majority judgments. If the set of propositions accepted by a
majority is inconsistent, it must have at least one minimally inconsistent subset,
but not all propositions in this set can be majority-accepted if the underlying
prole satises the combinatorial condition just dened. An important special
case is given by the condition of value-restriction (Dietrich and List 2007c),
which generalizes an equally named classic condition in the context of prefer-
ence aggregation (Sen 1966). A prole of individual judgment sets is called
value-restrictedif every minimally inconsistent subset of the agenda contains
a pair of propositions p, q not jointly accepted by any individual. Again, this
is enough to rule out that any minimally inconsistent set of propositions can
be majority-accepted: if it were, then, in particular, each of the propositions p
and q from the denition of value-restriction would be majority-accepted and
thus at least one individual would accept both, contradicting value-restriction.
(Several other domain restriction conditions are discussed in Dietrich and List
2007c.)
How plausible is the strategy of avoiding the impossibility of non-degenerate
judgment aggregation via restricting the domain of admissible inputs to the
aggregation rule? The answer to this question depends on the group, context
and decision problem at stake. As already noted, di¤erent groups exhibit dif-
ferent levels of pluralism, and it is clearly an empirical question whether or not
any of the identied combinatorial conditions are met by the empirically occur-
13Or the middle two individuals, if the total number of individuals is odd.
14Or the intersection of the judgments of the two middle individuals, if the total number of
individuals is even.
15Similarly, if the total number of individuals is even, the intersection of the individually
consistent judgment sets of the two middle individuals is still a consistent set of propositions.
16Assuming consistency and completeness of the individual judgment sets.
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ring proles of individual judgment sets in any given case. Some groups may
be naturally homogeneous or characterized by an entrenched one-dimensional
ideological or cognitive spectrum in terms of which group members tend to con-
ceptualize issues under consideration. Think, for example, of societies with a
strong tradition of a conventional ideological left-right polarization. Other so-
cieties or groups may not have such an entrenched structure, and yet through
group deliberation or other forms of communication they may be able to achieve
su¢ ciently cohesiveindividual judgments, which meet conditions such as unidi-
mensional alignment or value-restriction. In debates on the relationship between
social choice theory and the theory of deliberative democracy, the existence of
mechanisms along these lines has been hypothesized (Miller 1992, Knight and
Johnson 1994, Dryzek and List 2003). However, the present escape route from
the impossibility is certainly no one size ts allsolution.
5.2 Relaxing the output conditions
Like the input condition of universal domain, the output condition of collective
rationality occurs in all the impossibility theorems reviewed above. Again the
condition seems prima facie reasonable. First of all, the requirement of consis-
tent collective judgments is important not only from a pragmatic perspective 
after all, inconsistent judgments would fail to be action-guiding when it comes
to making concrete decisions but also from a more fundamental philosophical
one. As argued by Pettit (2001), collective consistency is essential for the con-
testability and justiability of collective decisions (for critical discussions of this
point, see also Kornhauser and Sager 2004 and List 2006). And secondly, the
requirement of complete collective judgments is also pragmatically important.
One would imagine that only those propositions will be included on the agenda
that require actual adjudication; and if they do, the formation of complete col-
lective judgments on them will be essential.
Nonetheless, the case for collective consistency is arguably stronger than
that for collective completeness. There is now an entire sequence of papers
in the literature that discuss relaxations of completeness (e.g., List and Pettit
2002; Gärdenfors 2006; Dietrich and List 2007b,d, 2008a; Dokow and Holz-
man 2006). Gärdenfors (2006), for instance, criticizes completeness as a strong
and unnatural assumption. However, it turns out that not every relaxation of
completeness is enough to avoid the impossibility of non-degenerate judgment
aggregation. As shown by Gärdenfors (2006) for a particular class of agen-
das (so-called atomlessagendas) and subsequently generalized by Dietrich and
List (2008a) and Dokow and Holzman (2006), if the collective completeness re-
quirement is weakened to a deductive closurerequirement according to which
propositions on the agenda that are logically entailed by other accepted propo-
sitions must also be accepted, then the other conditions reviewed above restrict
the possible aggregation rules to so-called oligarchicones. An aggregation rule
is oligarchicif there exists an antecedently xed non-empty subset of the in-
dividuals the oligarchssuch that the collective judgment set is always the
intersection of the individual judgment sets of the oligarchs. (A dictatorial ag-
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gregation rule is the limiting case in which the set of oligarchs is singleton.) In
fact, a table very similar to Table 3 above can be derived in which the output
condition is relaxed to the conjunction of consistency and deductive closure and
the right-most column is extended to the class of oligarchic aggregation rules
(for technical details, see Dietrich and List 2008a).
However, if collective rationality is weakened further, namely to consistency
alone, more promising possibilities open up. In particular, groups may then
use supermajority rules according to which any proposition on the agenda is
collectively accepted if and only if it is accepted by a certain supermajority of
individuals, such as more than two thirds, three quarters, or four fths of them.
If the supermajority threshold is chosen to be su¢ ciently large, such rules pro-
duce consistent (but not generally deductively closed) collective judgments (List
and Pettit 2002). In particular, any threshold above k 1k is su¢ cient to ensure
collective consistency, where k is the size of the largest minimally inconsistent
subset of the agenda (Dietrich and List 2007b). In the court and government
examples above, this numer is three, and thus a supermajority threshold above
two thirds would be su¢ cient for collective consistency. Supermajority rules, of
course, satisfy all the other (input and responsiveness) conditions that I have
reviewed.
Groups with a strongly consensual culture, such as the UN Security Council
or the EU Council of Minister, may very well take this supermajoritarian ap-
proach to solving judgment aggregation problems. The price they have to pay
for avoiding the impossibility of non-degenerate judgment aggregation in this
manner is the risk of stalemate. Small minorities will be able to veto judgments
on any propositions.17 As in the case of the earlier escape route via relaxing
universal domain the present one is no one size ts allsolution to the problem
of judgment aggregation.
5.3 Relaxing the responsiveness conditions
Arguably, the most compelling escape-route from the impossibility of non-
degenerate judgment aggregation opens up when we relax some of the respon-
siveness conditions used in the impossibility theorems. The key condition here is
independence, i.e., the rst part of the systematicity condition, which requires
that the collective judgment on each proposition on the agenda depend only
on individual judgments on that proposition, not on individual judgments on
other propositions. The second part of systematicity, requiring that the crite-
rion for determining the collective judgment on each proposition be the same
across propositions, is already absent from several of the impossibility theorems
(namely whenever the agenda is su¢ ciently complex), and relaxing it alone is
thus insu¢ cient for avoiding the basic impossibility result in general.
17Furthermore, when both individual and collective judgment sets are only required to be
consistent, a recent impossibility theorem suggests that an asymmetry in the criteria for
accepting and for rejecting propositions is a necessary condition for avoiding degenerate ag-
gregation rules (Dietrich and List 2007d).
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If we give up independence, however, several promising aggregation rules
become possible. The simplest example of such a rule is the premise-based pro-
cedure, which I have already briey mentioned in the context of Kornhauser and
Sagers doctrinal paradox. This rule was discussed, originally under the name
issue-by-issue voting, by Kornhauser and Sager (1986) and Kornhauser (1992),
and later by Pettit (2001), List and Pettit (2002), Chapman (2002), Bovens and
Rabinowicz (2006), Dietrich (2006) and many others. Abstracting from the
court example, the premise-based procedureinvolves designating some propo-
sitions on the agenda as premisesand others as conclusionsand generating
the collective judgments by taking majority votes on all premises and then de-
riving the judgments on all conclusions from these majority judgments on the
premises; by construction, the consistency of the resulting collective judgments
is guaranteed, provided the premises are logically independent from each other.
If these premises further constitute a logical basisfor the entire agenda i.e.,
they are not only logically independent but any assignment of truth-values to
them also settles the truth-values of all other propositions then the premise-
based procedure also ensures collective completeness.18 (The conclusion-based
procedure, by contrast, violates completeness, in so far as it only ever generates
collective judgments on the conclusion(s), by taking majority votes on them
alone.)
The premise-based procedure, in turn, is a special case of a sequential prior-
ity procedure(List 2004). To dene such an aggregation rules, we must specify
a particular order of priority among the propositions on the agenda such that
earlier propositions in that order are interpreted as epistemically (or otherwise)
prior to later ones. For each prole of individual judgments sets, the proposi-
tions are then considered one-by-one in the specied order and the collective
judgment on each proposition is formed as follows. If the majority judgment on
the proposition is consistent with the collective judgments on propositions con-
sidered earlier, then that majority judgment becomes the collective judgment;
but if the majority judgment is inconsistent with those earlier judgments, then
the collective judgment is determined by the implications of those earlier judg-
ments. In the example of Table 2 above, the multi-member government might
consider the propositions in the order p, if p then q, q (with negations inter-
spersed) and then accept p and if p then q by majority voting while accepting q
by logical inference. The collective judgment set under such an aggregation rule
is dependent on the specied order of priority among the propositions. This
property of path-dependencecan be seen as a virtue or as a vice, depending
on the perspective one takes. On the one hand, it appears to do justice to the
fact that propositions can di¤er in their status (consider, for example, constitu-
18A rst general formulation of the premise-based procedure in terms of a subset Y of the
agenda interpreted as the set of premises was given in List and Pettit (2002). Furthermore, as
shown by Dietrich (2006), the premise-based procedure can be axiomatically characterized in
terms of the key condition of independence restricted to Y , where Y is the premise-set. In
some cases, an impossibility result reoccurs when the condition of unanimity preservation is
imposed, as shown for certain agendas by Mongins (forthcoming) theorem mentioned in the
previous section. For recent extensions, see Dietrich and Mongin (2007).
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tional propositions versus propositions of ordinary law), as emphasized by Pettit
(2001) and Chapman (2002). But on the other hand, it makes collective judg-
ments manipulable by an agenda setter who can inuence the order in which
propositions are considered (List 2004), which in turn echoes a much-discussed
worry in social choice theory (e.g., Riker 1982).
Another class of aggregation rules that give up independence the class of
distance-based ruleswas introduced by Pigozzi (2006), drawing on related
work on the theory of belief merging in computer science (Konieczny and Pino
Pérez 2002). Unlike premise-based or sequential priority procedures, these rules
are not based on the idea of prioritizing some propositions over others. Instead,
they are based on a distance metricbetween judgment sets. We can dene
the distancebetween any two judgment sets for instance by counting the num-
ber of propositions on the agenda on which they disagree(i.e., the number of
propositions for which it is not the case that the proposition is contained in
the one judgment set if and only if it is contained in the other). A distance-
based aggregation rulenow assigns to each prole of individual judgment sets
the collective judgment set that minimizes the sum-total distance from the in-
dividual judgment sets (with some additional stipulation for dealing with ties).
Distance-based aggregation rules have a number of interesting properties. They
can be seen to capture the idea of reaching a compromise between di¤erent
individualsjudgment sets. Most importantly, they give up independence while
still preserving the spirit of neutrality across propositions (so long as we adopt
a denition of distance that treats all propositions on the agenda equally).
What is the cost of violating independence? Arguably, the greatest cost is
manipulability of the aggregation rule by the submission of insincere individual
judgments (Dietrich and List 2007e). Call an aggregation rule manipulableif
there exists at least one admissible prole of individual judgment sets such that
the following is true for at least one individual and at least one proposition on
the agenda: (i) if the individual submits the judgment set that he/she genuinely
holds, then the collective judgment on the proposition in question di¤ers from
the individuals genuine judgment on it; (ii) if he/she submits a strategically
adjusted judgment set, then the collective judgment on that proposition coin-
cides with the individuals genuine judgment on it. If an aggregation rule is
manipulable in this sense, then individuals may have incentives to misrepresent
their judgments.19 To illustrate, if the court in the example of Table 1 were to
use the premise-based procedure, sincere voting among the judges would lead to
a liableverdict, as we have seen. However, if judge 3 were su¢ ciently strongly
opposed to this outcome, he or she could strategically manipulate it by pre-
tending to believe that q is false, contrary to his or her sincere judgment; the
result would be the majority rejection of proposition q, and hence a not liable
verdict. It can be shown that an aggregation rule is non-manipulable if and only
if it satises the conditions of independence and monotonicity introduced above
(Dietrich and List 2007e; for closely related results in a more classic social-
19The precise relationship between opportunities and incentives for manipulation is dis-
cussed in Dietrich and List (2007e).
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choice-theoretic framework, see Nehring and Puppe 2007b). Assuming that,
other things being equal, the relaxation of independence is the most promising
way to make non-degenerate judgment aggregation possible, the impossibility
theorems reviewed above can therefore be seen as pointing to a trade-o¤ be-
tween degeneracy of judgment aggregation on the one hand (most notably, in
the form of dictatorship) and its potential manipulability on the other. As in
other branches of social choice theory, a perfect aggregation rule does not exist.
6 The relationship to other aggregation prob-
lems
Before concluding, it is useful to consider the relationship between the theory
of judgment aggregation and other branches of aggregation theory. Let me
focus on three related aggregation problems: preference aggregation, abstract
aggregation and probability aggregation.
6.1 Preference aggregation
The theory of preference aggregation in the long and established tradition of
Condorcet and Arrow addresses the following question: How can a group of
individuals arrive at a collective preference ordering on some set of alternatives
on the basis of the group members individual preference orderings on them?
Condorcets classic paradox illustrates some of the challenges raised by this
problem. Consider a group of individuals seeking to form collective preferences
over three alternatives, x, y and z, where the rst individual prefers x to y to
z, the second y to z to x, and the third z to x to y. It is then easy to see
that majority voting over pairs of alternatives fails to yield a rational collective
preference ordering: there are majorities for x over y, for y over z, and yet for
z over x a preference cycle. Arrows theorem (1951/1963) generalizes this
observation by showing that, when there are three or more alternatives, the only
aggregation rules that generally avoid such cycles and satisfy some other minimal
conditions are dictatorial ones. Condorcets paradox and Arrows theorem have
inspired a massive literature on axiomatic social choice theory, a review of which
is entirely beyond the scope of this paper.
How is the theory of preference aggregation related to the theory of judg-
ment aggregation? It turns out that preference aggregation problems can be for-
mally represented within the model of judgment aggregation. The idea is that
preference orderings can be represented as sets of accepted preference ranking
propositions of the form x is preferable to y, y is preferable to z, and so on.
To construct this representation formally (following Dietrich and List 2007,
extending List and Pettit 2004), it is necessary to employ a specially devised
predicate logic with two or more constants representing alternatives, denoted
x, y, z and so on, and a two-place predicate _is preferable to_. To capture
the standard rationality conditions on preferences (such as asymmetry, transi-
tivity and connectedness), we dene a set of propositions in our predicate logic
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to be consistentjust in case this set is consistent relative to those rationality
conditions. For example, the set fx is preferable to y, y is preferable to zg is
consistent, while the set fx is preferable to y, y is preferable to z, z is preferable
to xg representing a preference cycle is not. The agenda is then dened as
the set of all propositions of the form v is preferable to wand their negations,
where v and w are alternatives among x, y, z and so on. Now each consistent
and complete judgment set on this agenda uniquely represents a rational (i.e.,
asymmetric, transitive and connected) preference ordering. For instance, the
judgment set fx is preferable to y, y is preferable to z, x is preferable to zg
uniquely represents the preference ordering according to which x is most pre-
ferred, y second-most preferred, and z least preferred. Furthermore, a judgment
aggregation rule on the given agenda uniquely represents an Arrovian preference
aggregation rule (i.e., a function from proles of individual preference orderings
to collective preference orderings).
Under this construction, Condorcets paradox of cyclical majority prefer-
ences becomes a special case of the problem of majority inconsistency discussed
in section 2 above. To see this, notice that the judgment sets of the three indi-
viduals in the example of Condorcets paradox are as shown in Table 5. Given
these individual judgments, the majority judgments are indeed inconsistent, as
the set of propositions accepted by a majority is inconsistent relative to the
rationality condition of transitivity.
x is preferable to y y is preferable to z x is preferable to z
Individual 1
(x  y  z) True True True
Individual 2
(y  z  x) False True False
Individual 3
(z  x  y) True False False
Majority True True False
Table 5: Condorcets paradox translated into jugdment aggregation
More generally, it can be shown that, when there are three or more alter-
natives, the agenda just dened has all the complexity properties introduced in
the discussion of the impossibility theorems above (i.e., non-simplicity, even-
number-negatability, and total blockedness / path-connectedness), and thus
those theorems apply to the case of preference aggregation. In particular,
the only aggregation rules satisfying universal domain, collective rationality,
independence and unanimity preservation are dictatorships (Dietrich and List
2007, Dokow and Holzman forthcoming; for a similar result with an additional
monotonicity condition, see Nehring 2003). This is precisely Arrows classic im-
possibility theorem for strict preferences: the conditions of universal domain and
collective rationality correspond to Arrows equally named conditions, indepen-
dence corresponds to Arrows so-called independence of irrelevant alternatives,
and unanimity preservation, nally, corresponds to Arrows weak Pareto prin-
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ciple.
6.2 Abstract aggregation
The problem of judgment aggregation is closely related to the problem of ab-
stract aggregation rst formulated by Wilson (1975) (in the binary version dis-
cussed here) and later generalized by Rubinstein and Fishburn (1986) (in a
non-binary version). In recent work, the problem has been discussed by Dokow
and Holzman (forthcoming) and in a slightly di¤erent formulation (the prop-
erty space formulation) by Nehring and Puppe (2002, 2007a). Again let me
begin by stating the key question: How can a group of individuals arrive at a
collective vector of yes/no evaluations over a set of binary issues on the basis of
the group membersindividual evaluations over them, subject to some feasibility
constraints? Suppose there are multiple binary issues on which a positive (1) or
negative (0) view is to be taken. An evaluation vectorover these issues is an
assignment of 0s and 1s to them. Let Z  f0; 1gk be the set of evaluation vec-
tors deemed feasible, where k is the total number of issues. Now an abstract
aggregation rule is a function that maps each prole of individual evaluation
vectors in a given domain of feasible ones to a collective evaluation vector. To
represent Kornhauser and Sagers court example in this model, we introduce
three issues, corresponding to propositions p, q and r, and dene the set of fea-
sible evaluation vectors to be Z = f(0; 0; 0); (0; 1; 0); (1; 0; 0); (1; 1; 1)g, i.e., the
set of 0/1 assignments that respect the doctrinal constraint whereby positive
evaluations on the rst two issues (corresponding to p and q) are necessary and
su¢ cient for a positive evaluation on the third one (corresponding to r). More
generally, a judgment aggregation problem can be represented in the abstract
aggregation model by dening the set of feasible evaluation vectors to be the
set of admissible truth-value assignments to the unnegated propositions on the
agenda. The problem of majoritarian inconsistency then reemerges as a failure
of issue-wise majority voting to preserve feasibility from the individual to the
collective level.
As discussed in List and Puppe (forthcoming), the model of abstract ag-
gregation is informationally sparser than the logic-based model of judgment
aggregation. To see that by translating judgment aggregation problems into
abstract ones we lose some information, notice that the same set of feasible
evaluation vectors may result from very di¤erent agendas and thus from very
di¤erent decision problems. For example, the set of feasible evaluation vectors
resulting from the agenda containing p, p if and only if q, p and q (and nega-
tions), without any doctrinal constraint, coincides with that resulting from the
agenda in the court example namely Z as just dened although syntactically
and interpretationally those agendas are clearly very di¤erent from each other.
The abstract aggregation model is arguably at its strongest when our pri-
mary interest lies in how the existence of non-degenerate aggregation rules de-
pends on the nature of the feasibility constraints, as opposed to the particular
syntactic structure or interpretation of the underlying propositions. Indeed,
the agenda characterization theorems reviewed above have their intellectual ori-
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gins in the literature on abstract aggregation (and here particularly in Nehring
and Puppes 2002 work as well as in Dokow and Holzmans forthcoming subse-
quent paper). When the logical formulation of a decision problem is to be made
explicit, or when the rationality constraints on judgments (and their possible
relaxations) are to be analyzed using logical concepts, on the other hand, the
logic-based model of judgment aggregation seems more natural.
6.3 Probability aggregation
In the theory of probability aggregation, nally, the focus is not on making
consistent acceptance/rejection judgments on the propositions of interest, but
rather on arriving at a coherent probability assignment to them (e.g., McConway
1981, Genest and Zidek 1986, Mongin 1995). Thus the central question is: How
can a group of individuals arrive at a collective probability assignment to a given
set of propositions on the basis of the group members individual probability
assignments, while preserving probabilistic coherence (i.e., the satisfaction of
the standard axioms of probability theory)? The problem is quite a general one.
In a number of decision-making settings, the aim is not so much to come up with
acceptance/rejection judgments on certain propositions but rather to arrive at
probabilistic information about the degree of belief we are entitled to assign to
them or the likelihood of the events they refer to.
Interestingly, the move from a binary to a probabilistic setting opens up
some non-degenerate possibilities of aggregation not existent in the standard
case of judgment aggregation. A key insight is that probabilistic coherence is
preserved under linear averaging of probability assignments. In other words, if
each individual coherently assigns probabilities to a given set of propositions,
then any weighted linear average of these probability assignments across indi-
viduals still constitutes an overall coherent probability assignment. Moreover,
it is easy to see that this method of aggregation satises the analogues of all the
input, output and responsiveness conditions introduced above: i.e., it accepts
all possible proles of coherent individual probability assignments as input, pro-
duces a coherent collective probability assignment as output and satises the
analogues of systematicy and unanimity preservation; it also satises anonymity
if all individuals are given equal weight in the averaging. A classic theorem by
McConway (1981) shows that, if the agenda is isomorphic to a Boolean alge-
bra with more than four elements, linear averaging is uniquely characterized by
an independence condition, a unanimity preservation condition as well as the
analogues of universal domain and collective rationality. Recently, Dietrich and
List (2008b) have obtained a generalization of (a variant of) this theorem for a
much larger class of agendas (essentially, the analogue of non-simple agendas).
A challenge for the future is to obtain even more general theorems that yield
both standard results on judgment aggregation and interesting characterizations
of salient probability aggregation methods as special cases.
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7 Concluding remarks
The aim of this article has been to give a brief introduction to the theory of
judgment aggregation. My focus has been on some of the central ideas and
questions of the theory as well as a few illustrative results. Inevitably, a large
number of other important results and promising research directions within the
literature have been omitted (for surveys of other important results and direc-
tions, see, for example, List and Puppe forthcoming, List 2006, Dietrich 2007a,
Nehring and Puppe 2007a as well as the online bibliography on judgment ag-
gregation at http://personal.lse.ac.uk/list/JA.htm). In particular, the bulk of
this article has focused on judgment aggregation in accordance with a system-
aticity or independence condition that forces the aggregation to take place in
a proposition-by-proposition manner. Arguably, some of the most interesting
open questions in the theory of judgment aggregation concern the relaxation of
this propositionwise restriction and the move towards other, potentially more
holisticnotions of responsiveness. Without the restriction to propositionwise
aggregation, the space of possibilities suddenly grows dramatically, and I have
here reviewed only a few simple examples of aggregation rules that become
possible, namely premise-based, sequential priority and distance-based ones.
To provide a more systematic perspective on those possibilities, Dietrich
(2007b) has recently introduced a general condition of independence of irrel-
evant information, dened in terms of a relation of informational relevance
between propositions. An aggregation rule satises this condition just in case
the collective judgment on each proposition depends only on individual judg-
ments on propositions that are deemed relevant to it. In the classical case of
propositionwise aggregation, each proposition is deemed relevant only to itself.
In the case of a premise-based procedure, by contrast, premises are deemed
relevant to conclusions, and in the case of a sequential priority procedure the
relevance relation is given by a linear order of priority among the propositions.
Important future research questions concern the precise interplay between the
logical structure of the agenda, the relevance relation and the conditions on
aggregation rules in determining the space of possibilities.
Another research direction considers the idea of decisiveness rights in the con-
text of judgment aggregation, following Sens classic work (1970) on the liberal
paradox. In judgment aggregation, it is particularly interesting to investigate
the role of experts and the question of whether we can arrive at consistent col-
lective judgments when giving di¤erent individuals di¤erent weights depending
on their expertise on the propositions in question. Some existing impossibility
results (Dietrich and List 2008c) highlight the di¢ culties that can result from
such deference to experts, but many open questions remain.
Finally, as in other areas of social choice theory, there is much research to be
done on the relationship between aggregative and deliberative modes of decision-
making. In many realistic settings, decision-makers do not merely mechanically
aggregate their votes or judgments, but they exchange and share information,
communicate with each other and update their beliefs. Some authors have begun
to consider possible connections between the theory of judgment aggregation
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and the theory of belief revision (Pettit 2006, List 2008, Dietrich 2008c, Pivato
2008). But much of this terrain is still unexplored. My hope is that this article
will contribute to stimulating further research.
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